(3.12) 讲座预告｜Herman Cappelen：为什么“人工智能可以有意识吗？”是个毫无意义的问题

Many theorists think it is urgent to find out whether AI systems can be conscious. This paper argues that the question should be abandoned—it’s a bad question that isn’t worth trying to answer: First, I show that our concept of ‘consciousness’ is so defective that it’s unsuitable for serious theorizing. The terminological paraphernalia surrounding it has fueled a pseudo-research project that should be left behind.

Second, I argue that the phenomena theorists call ‘consciousness’ are never as interesting, important, or valuable as they are made out to be. For example, having a centralized cognitive hub that integrates and distributes information across brain systems (one way some people characterize consciousness) is just one way to organize information processing—and not philosophically significant. The point generalizes: when theorists try to describe ‘consciousness’ without the defective terminology, it’s always turns out to be something that’s somewhere between insignificant and moderately interesting .