Liu Qingping: Emotionales versus Rationales: A Comparison between Confucius’ and Socrates’ Ethics

Emotionales versus Rationales: A Comparison between Confucius’ and Socrates’ Ethics[1]

(Originally published in Asian Philosophy (A&HCI), 2013, 23 (1): 86-99)

LIU Qingping

Fudan Institute for Advanced Study in Social Sciences, Fudan University

ABSTRACT   Socrates regards rational knowledge as the decisive factor of human life and even ascribes all virtues and moral actions to it, thereby stressing the ‘rationales’ of ethics. In contrast, Confucius regards kinship love as the decisive factor of human life and even grounds all virtues and moral actions on it, thereby stressing the ‘emotionales’ of ethics. Therefore, we should not lump them by conceiving Confucius’ ethics also as the so-called ‘moral reason’.

KEY WORDS    emotionale, rationale, Confucius, Socrates, ethics

As the founders, respectively, of the Chinese and Greek ethical traditions, Confucius and Socrates are always an attractive theme of comparative studies, and a quite popular belief in these studies is that they display a similar tendency towards ‘moral reason’ or even ‘rationalism’.[2] Through a close reading of the Lunyu (Analects) and theMemorabilia of Xenophon as well as some of Plato’s early dialogues,[3] this article tries to argue that, in striking contrast to the ‘rationales’ stressed by Socrates’ ethics, Confucius’ ethics presents a characteristic spirit of ‘moral emotion’ and takes ‘emotionales’ as the governing principles of moral life.

1. Affection versus Knowledge

As is well known, Socrates’ philosophy shows a very marked and even radical tendency to emphasize rational knowledge. He is usually thought to be the first Greek philosopher who not only discusses human affairs through rational inquiry but also establishes the dominant position of moral reason in the tradition of Western ethics.

On Socrates’ conception, the rational soul is the most distinct character of the human being from other animals. He argues that the gods have implanted in human beings the noblest type of soul with the faculty of reasoning, whereby human beings are able to apprehend the existence of gods, to acquire knowledge by toil, and to reason about the objects of their perceptions, so that, in comparison with other animals, they live like gods, by nature peerless both in body and in soul (see Xenophon, 1959, p. 61, p. 303). In these arguments, Socrates displays an implicit intention of defining the human being as ‘animal rationale’, a key definition that has become more and more explicit and influential in the later developments of Western rational philosophy. As a man ‘who must be guided by reason’ (Plato, Crito 46B, Jowett, 1937, p. 430), in addition, he as a philosopher also pays a lot of attention to the question of how human beings can acquire rational knowledge through their faculty of reasoning. Aristotle remarks, ‘There are two innovations which may fairly be ascribed to Socrates: inductive reasoning and general definition. Both of these are associated with the starting-point of scientific knowledge.’ (Metaphysics 1078b, Tredennick &Armstrong, 1969, p. 197.)

Unlike the Greek natural philosophers who neglect human affairs and think about only ‘Universal Nature’,moreover, Socrates holds that one should first know oneself by using one’s reason according to the famous Delphic inscription. His conversations with his fellow Athenians are always of human affairs, especially of the moral virtues seemingly familiar to them. It is in these dialogues that Socrates arrives at a celebrated definition: ‘virtue is knowledge.’ He says, ‘For just actions and all forms of virtuous activity are beautiful and good. He who knows the beautiful and good will never choose anything else, he who is ignorant of them cannot do them, and even if he tries, will fail.’ (Xenophon, 1959, p. 225) Put differently, one as a moral being must, first of all, have knowledge about virtues and then take action according to this knowledge. In the framework of Socrates’ ethics, thus, all virtues and moral actions are grounded on rational knowledge, and reason plays a decisive role not only in the theoretical life but also in the practical life. Gregory Vlastos makes this point manifest: ‘Socrates is to rationalize the moral universe as relentlessly as the Ionian physiologoi had rationalized the physical universe’, and ‘His gods can be both supernatural and rational so long as they are rationally moral’ (1991, pp. 162-164). We may safely argue in this sense that Socrates’ ethics is of a characteristic spirit of ‘moral reason’.

By contrast, Confucius prefers to regard emotions,[4] especially such moral affections as ren (humane love) and xiao (filial piety), as the fundamental character of human beings as well as their moral life. He says, ‘If one be without ren, what has one to do with ritual propriety?’ (Lunyu 3:3)[5] This statement highlights the vital significance of ren, a sort of universal love for fellow humans, not only for observing ritual propriety in an explicit way but also for the human as a moral being in an implicit way. To be sure, today we could distinguish in Confucius’ teachings between ren as a specific virtue of humane love and ren as a general virtue that embraces all specific virtues and can make a person truly human (see Chan, 1955, pp. 297-298). However, we may not overlook a simple fact that Confucius himself does not isolate them from each other, but just employs this single term to refer to both of them.[6]This fact suggests that, for him, to love fellow humans in a humane way is essential for one to be a true human in the ethical sense. The famous Confucian maxim that ‘ren means the human’ can be understood also in terms of this stance of Confucius.[7] Meanwhile, You Ruo, one of his distinguished disciples whose words have often been regarded to resemble those of Confucius himself, claims, ‘Filial piety and brotherly respect are the root of ren.’ (Lunyu 1:2) No matter whether here the word ‘ren’ means humane love or the all-embracing virtue or even the human per se, this claim evidently affirms the crucial importance of filial piety, a kind of kinship love for parents, for the human as a moral being. In the framework of Confucius’ ethics, thus, it is not rational knowledge but moral sentiments that can make a person truly human. We may say in this sense that Confucius would have defined the human as ‘animal emotionale’ if he had tried to give a definition of the human. His followers have embraced these ideas faithfully. For instance, Mencius, who is the first Confucian thinker to develop a systematic theory of human nature, declares in the dimension of humane love: ‘Whoever is devoid of the heart of compassion is not a true human.’ (Mencius 2A6) In the meanwhile, he also remarks in the dimension of filial piety: ‘If one cannot get the hearts of one’s parents, one cannot be considered a true human.’ (Mencius 4A28)

Therefore, Confucius always highly praises the moral actions motivated by sincere moral sentiments and yetbelittles the ones merely out of a sense of duty. In his view, as stated above, it is even meaningless for people to take such moral actions as observing ritual propriety without humane love in their hearts. On another occasion, Confucius remarks in a similar tone, ‘The filial piety of nowadays means supporting parents. But even dogs and horses can be supported in a similar way. If one does not revere one’s parents, what is the difference?’ (Lunyu 2:7) Put differently, while one certainly ought to fulfill one’s filial duty to one’s parents, this fulfillment must not be done as a compulsory obligation, but it should stem from one’s genuine kinship love for them; otherwise, one would not get the hearts of one’s parents. It is true that, like humaneness to fellow humans, filial piety to parents as a virtue is more than an affection in the Confucian framework. According to this statement of Confucius, yet, its emotional dimension is plainly far more fundamental and decisive than its practical one. In a dialogue about the three-year mourning for late parents with his disciple Zai Wo, Confucius even sets an ethical standard of ‘feeling at ease in your heart’ (xin an) by which one could judge whether one ought to take an act or not. When Zai Wo claims that the three-year mourning will lead to a loss of the observances of ritual propriety, Confucius does not refute him by rational arguments, but just asks him a question to appeal his moral sentiments in his heart: ‘If you were to eat good rice and wear embroidered clothes after the one-year mourning, would you feel at ease?’ After Zai Wo answers in the affirmative, he continues his arguments and says twice, ‘If you feel at ease, do it’, though he really thinks that a filial son would not feel at ease in such circumstances and thus should not do it at all (see Lunyu 17:21). As a result, Confucius establishes an ‘emotionale’ of ‘justification by feeling at ease’ (xin an li de) that has been still prevalent among the Chinese people up to now: so long as an act can make you feel at ease in the moral dimension of your heart, you will have sufficient reason to do it.[8]

In his interpretation of the Lunyu, Fingarette remarks, ‘jen [ren] and its associated “virtues”, and li [ritual propriety] too, are not connected in the original text with the language of “will”, “emotion” and “inner states”.’ (1972, p. 43) Unfortunately, this remark is misleading for purposes of a philosophical understanding of Confucius. Indeed, Confucius has not the ‘rational’ ideas of the Western kind about the subject/object distinctions. However, this lack is unlikely to prevent him from connecting ren or other virtues with ‘emotion’ or ‘inner states’ according to the ‘emotionales’ of the Chinese kind. On the contrary, it is in light of this very connection that Confucius holds that ‘jenis the aspect of conduct that directs our attention to the particular person and his orientation as the actor’ (Fingarette,1972, p. 47), because, for him, the conduct of ren is significant in moral sense if and only if it is intrinsically motivated by sincere moral feelings such as humane love and filial love.

Comparatively speaking, then, Socrates explains human nature and moral virtues in terms of rational knowledge, whereas Confucius explains human nature and moral virtues in terms of human sentiments. Socrates holds that an act is virtuous only if it is grounded on rational knowledge, whereas Confucius holds that an act is virtuous only if it is motivated by moral feelings. In listing some of the most important differences between them, thus,Jiyuan Yu remarks, ‘For Socrates, to pursue virtue is an intellectual process’, whereas ‘Confucius does not regard virtue as being purely an intellectual matter’, since the pursuit of ren requires one ‘to love his fellow men that is rooted in filial piety and brotherly love’ (2005, pp. 184-185). Therefore, if we call the spirit of Socrates’ ethics ‘rational’, perhaps we should call the spirit of Confucius’ ethics ‘emotional’ in contrast.

2. The Emotional versus the Rational

Not surprisingly, there is also a sharp contrast between Confucius’ and Socrates’ stances on the relationship between the emotional and the rational in the ethical sphere.

Contrary to Confucius, Socrates overtly depreciates the constructive function of emotions in moral life and even tries to exclude them form the domain of virtues. To be sure, he often speaks of the virtues relative to passion or affection, such as courage, piety, and friendship. Nonetheless, he ascribes them to rational knowledge without exception. For example, in order to prove his idea that ‘the knowledge of that which is and is not dangerous is courage’, Socrates severely rebuts in the Protagoras the popular belief that knowledge is a slave dragged about by feelings and emotions and that people are not overmastered by it but mostly by anger, pleasure, pain, love, or fear. In his view, on the one hand, ‘knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which cannot be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows the difference of good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to knowledge.’ On the other hand, ‘men err…from defect of knowledge’, and ‘the erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This…is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure.’ According to his position, then, rational knowledge alone is the ultimate cause of all good actions, while ignorance or ‘being overcome by pleasure’ is the main source of erring actions. Therefore, Socrates is firmly convinced that ‘there was nothing mightier than knowledge, and that knowledge, in whatever existing, must have the advantage over pleasure and all other things’(see Plato, Protagoras 352C-360D, Jowett, 1937, pp. 121-129).

Starting from this stance, Socrates greatly highlights the antagonistic relationship between the rational and the emotional in the ethical sphere. Although admitting that the gods have also endowed human beings with senses and the best body, he always puts soul above body and emphasizes that rational knowledge is the highest and most divine of all human things, while sensual passion is even more dangerous than the scorpion. That is the chief reason why Socrates values the control of rational knowledge over passions and appetites so much. In his view, ‘only the self-controlled have power to consider the things that matter most, and, sorting them out after their kind, by word and deed alike to prefer the good and reject the evil’, whereas those who are ruled by bodily pleasures and are unable to do what is best have no concern whatever with virtue in any form and thus are worse than the dullest beast(see Xenophon, 1959, pp. 331-333). Besides, it is said that ‘in control of his own passions and appetites he was the strictest of men’ and that ‘his heart was set not on those who were fair to outward view, but on those whose souls excelled in goodness’ (Xenophon, 1959, p. 13, p. 265).

In the framework of Socrates’ ethics, consequently, emotions as well as appetites have mostly negative significance, and rational knowledge alone can provide a solid foundation for the whole human life. Therefore, his ethics is not only rationalist but is also intellectualist (see Guthrie, 1971, p. 5, p. 135). Aristotle comments on Socrates’ ethics as follows:

For he regarded the Virtues as mere departments of science; which they cannot possibly be. All departments of science presuppose a Rational Principle or Standard; and this is the product of the soul’s intellectual part. According therefore to Socrates, all the virtues arise in the reasoning part of the soul; from which it follows that in making the virtues departments of science he ignores our irrational part, and thus ignores both passion and the moral character. Clearly then this was not the right way to deal with the virtues. (Magna Moralia 1182a, Tredennick & Armstrong, 1969, pp. 449-451)

While Plato develops a tripartite theory of the soul to correct Socrates’ radical intellectualism,[9] he and most of the later Western philosophers, including Aristotle, have still put much stress on the overriding importance of the rational part as well as its absolute domination of the irrational parts to carry on the ‘rationales’ first established by Socrates in the ethical field (see Vlastos, 1991, pp. 86-91). It is against this rational tendency that Hume declares, ‘Since reason alone can never produce any action’, the rules of morality ‘are not conclusions of our reason’; rather, ‘sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature’ and ‘it produces our sentiment of morals in all the artificial virtues’ (see Hume, 1964, p. 414, p. 457, pp. 577-578).

Indeed, Confucius never denies the positive role of knowledge (zhi) and thinking (si) in human life, but pays a lot of attention to them (see Hall & Ames, 1987, pp.43-56). We may say in this sense that his ethics also develops an ‘intellectual’ aspect. Unlike Socrates, however, Confucius does not regard knowledge and thinking as the decisive factors of human nature and moral life. In his view, they are the mere function (yong) rather than the substance (ti) for becoming a moral being, as they alone cannot make a person truly human, but may merely help a person strengthen and extend the moral sentiments essential to the human being. Without humane love and filial piety as the ‘substance’, therefore, they would be of little significance.[10] That is why Confucius always subordinates them to moral feelings. He says, ‘A youth should be filial at home and be respectful to their elders abroad, be earnest and truthful, love all people and be intimate with persons of humaneness. If in so behaving he still has energy left, he may use it to improve himself through study.’ (Lunyu 1:6) In other words, the first and most important thing for a person in self-cultivation is not to learn about virtues, but is to take emotionally-motivated moral actions. Furthermore, Confucius also draws a general comparison as follows: ‘To know it is not as good as to love it, and to love it is not as good as to take pleasure in it.’ (Lunyu 6:20) Hu Shi claims according to this statement of Confucius, ‘There was much in Confucius that reminds us of Socrates. Like Socrates, Confucius always professed that he was…a man who loved knowledge.’ (1967, pp. 108-109) However, perhaps it is plain enough that here Confucius’ aim is not at all to encourage people to love knowledge, but is to value taking pleasure in moral actions more than merely knowing virtues. As is well known, Confucius himself is ever said to be the one ‘who knows something to be impracticable and yet still does it’ (Lunyu 14:38). This character of his might be reasonably explained by his own position that one should take moral sentiments, not rational knowledge, as the ultimate motivation for practical life: while knowing that a specific act will fail in reality, Confucius still sticks to it since he can feel at ease or even take pleasure in it in the dimension of moral emotions. Considering this point, we may easily understand why wisdom usually follows humaneness, rightness, and propriety in the four cardinal Confucian virtues, whereas it is frequently put in the first place among the four cardinal Greek virtues.

Indeed again, Confucius never endorses the indulgence in bodily pleasures. He says, ‘Do not look at anything that violates propriety; do not listen to anything that violates propriety; do not speak about anything that violates propriety; do not do anything that violates propriety.’ (Lunyu 12:1) These statements may be viewed as a manifesto for a Confucian sort of self-control. Nevertheless, here the key factor by which one dominates one’s sensual desires is not rational knowledge but propriety that is full of moral sentiments such as filial piety to parents, loyalty to ruler, and humane love for fellow humans. Hence, Confucius declares in the same passage: ‘Through self-control and observing ritual propriety one will become humane.’ Meanwhile, he seldom spotlights the antagonistic relationship between moral feelings and sensual desires in such a radical way as Socrates does between rational knowledge and sensual desires, but often promotes a harmonious unity of them. As Wei-ming Tu points out, the Confucian idea of self-control ‘does not mean that one should engage in a bitter struggle with one’s own corporeal desires. It suggests instead that one should fulfill them in an ethical context.’ (1979, p. 6) For instance, Confucius remarks twice, ‘I have yet to meet one who loves virtue as loving physical beauty.’ (Lunyu 9:18, 15:13) Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont seem to understand this remark to mean that one should love virtue more than love physical beauty, since they translate it as ‘I have yet to meet the person who is fonder of excellence than of physical beauty’ (1998, p. 130, p. 187). Unfortunately, that is a misreading of this text, for what Confucius genuinely means here is not that one should love virtue more than physical beauty, but rather that one should love virtue out of one’s nature and take great pleasure in this love in the same way as one loves physical beauty. It is in this sense that Daxue stresses, ‘What is meant by “making your intention sincere” is allowing no self-deception, as you hate a bad smell or love a perfect beauty. This is called self-enjoyment.’ (Daxue 6) It is also in this sense that Mencius declares, ‘Moral principles please my heart in the same way as meat pleases my mouth.’ (Mencius 6A7)[11] Needless to say, there is a profound divergence between Confucius’ maxim ‘love virtue as loving beauty’ and Socrates’ one ‘love virtue as loving wisdom’. At least, the former suggests that Confucius does not regard the satisfaction of natural desiressomething evil in itself, but affirms its rightfulness so long as it neither transgresses propriety nor hurts the moralsentiments essential to the human being. According to the descriptions of Lunyu 10, in point of fact, he does not refuse the sensuous enjoyments of food and clothing in accord with property in daily life, either.

Viewed from a comparative perspective, then, Socrates’ ethics places knowledge above emotion and stresses the radical tension and antagonism between moral reason and sensuous pleasure, whereas Confucius’ ethics places emotion above knowledge and stresses the intrinsic harmony and unity between moral affection and sensuouspleasure. Consequently, Socrates’ ethics seems lack of the ‘emotionales’ of the Confucius’ sort, whereas Confucius’ ethics seems lack of the ‘rationales’ of the Socrates’ sort. Anyway, if we have no reason to call Hume’s ethics, which is grounded on the principle of sympathy, ‘moral reason’ or ‘rationalism’, certainly we have no reason to call Confucius’ ethics, which is grounded on the principles of filial piety and humane love, ‘moral reason’ or ‘rationalism’,either.

3. Filial love versus Justice

Interestingly, Confucius and Socrates strongly argue for filial piety to parents in the Lunyu and theMemorabilia, respectively. Nonetheless, their similar positions on this issue cannot cover up the striking contrast between emotionales and rationales.

In his dialogue with Zai Wo, as stated above, Confucius holds that the superior man should carry out the three-year mourning for his later parents even at the risk of losing the observances of ritual propriety because a shorter-term mourning would make him feel at unease in his heart. Then he says, ‘It is not till a child is three years old that it is allowed to leave the arms of its parents…. Could Zai Wo also show the three-year affection for his parents?’(Lunyu 17:21) On noticing that his son is angry with his mother, likewise, Socrates tries to persuade his son to honor her. First, he convinces his son that ingratitude is injustice pure and simple and that the greater the benefits received the greater the injustice of not showing gratitude. Then he says,

Now what deeper obligation can we find than that of children to their parents? To their parents children own their being and their portion of all fair sights and all blessings that the gods bestow on men…. Don’t you know that even the state… inflicts penalties on the man who is discourteous to his parents and rejects him as unworthy of office, holding that it would be a sin for him to offer sacrifices on behalf of the state and that he is unlikely to do anything else honorably and rightly? (Xenophon, 1959, pp. 103-105, p. 111)

The conclusions they draw in these dialogues are quite alike: children should be filial to their parents. In addition, both the thinkers give a similar reason for their conclusions: parents give birth to children and bring them up, and thus greatly benefit them. However, we can still discern some subtle yet significant divergences under these similarities.

First, Socrates proves his conclusion mainly through logical inference, as he starts with a general major premise that everyone should show the gratitude for benefits received, then he introduces a particular minor premise that parents benefit children most, and finally he concludes in an explicit way that one ought to be filial to one’s parents. In contrast, Confucius proves his conclusion mainly through ‘emotional enlightenment’, as he starts with an experiential fact that parents give birth to children and bring them up, then he appeals to one’s kinship feelings for one’s parents directly by this fact, and finally he concludes in an implicit way that one ought to fulfill one’s filial duty out of these feelings. In brief, Socrates’ method of argument is a rational one primarily grounded on logical reasoning and resorting to one’s intellectual mind, whereas Confucius’ is an emotional one primarily grounded on personal feelings and resorting to one’s affective heart.

Secondly, for Socrates, one should be filial to one’s parents because otherwise one would violate the universal principle of justice—everyone should show the gratitude for benefits received—in both logical and ethical dimensions and thus would, as it were, feel at unease in one’s intellectual mind. In contrast, for Confucius, one should be filial because otherwise one would ignore the personal experience of consanguinity—one’s parents give birth to one and bring one up—in both emotional and ethical dimensions and thus would feel at unease in one’s affective heart. Hence, while both of them believe that an unfilial son should not be appointed as an official, their respective grounds for this belief are quite different. For Socrates, it is because the unfilial son transgresses the fundamental principle of justice, by which people enact laws and administer states, and thus is unlikely to do anything else rightly. For Confucius, it is because the unfilial son transgresses the fundamental principle of filial piety, by which people carry out the work of government (see Lunyu 2:21), and thus is unlikely to do anything else rightly. In brief, Socrates considers universal justice to be the primary principle of ethical life and subordinates anything else to it, whereas Confucius considers consanguineous affection to be the primary principle of ethical life and subordinates anything else to it.

Last but not least, Socrates values universal justice to everyone, which can be eventually reduced to rational knowledge in his view, as the supreme and inviolable principle of human life when he is convinced that whoever violates this ultimate principle is to be punished for this reason, whereas Confucius values particular filial piety to one’s parents, which is a sort of consanguineous affection, as the supreme and inviolable principle of human life when he is convinced that one should practice the three-year mourning even at the risk of losing ritual propriety. Perhaps this contrast, which may be demonstrated further by some statements Confucius and Socrates made in the cases of conflict between filial piety and other virtues, can show the profound differences between their ethics in a most impressive way.

For instance, Confucius declares, ‘a man who for three years does not alter from his father’s way may be called filial.’ (Lunyu 1:11) A Neo-Confucian interprets this statement thus: ‘If his father’s way is right, he may not alter from it in all his life; if it is not right, why should not he alter from it within three years? The reason is that otherwise the filial son would not feel at ease in his heart.’ (see Zhu, 1983, p. 51) Besides, Confucius is alsoconvinced that a son should conceal the misconduct of his father dutifully even if his father steals a sheep (see Lunyu13:18). As Benjamin Schwartz remarks, ‘It is not that he approves of stealing. It is that the sacred familial ties are so overriding in importance that even in a case as painful as this they must be preserved.’ (1985, pp. 102-103) On Confucius’ conception, then, one may place filial love for parents above the right way, honesty, obedience to the laws, or justice, since only feeling at ease in this love forms the ultimate principle of human conduct. In the Lunyu, virtually, he hardly advises people to give up filial piety and choose other virtues in cases of conflict, but always encourages them to give up other virtues and choose filial piety. Therefore, we may argue in this sense that Confucius assigns consanguineous affection alone a supreme position in human life and thus establishes an ultimate principle of ‘justification by filial piety’: any act can be justified if it is motivated by kinship love or aims at preserving this love, even though it might go against justice or other virtues. Mencius further specifies this stance of Confucius in an unambiguous way, claiming repeatedly: ‘The service of parents is the greatest’ (Mencius 4A19); ‘Of all which a filial son can attain to, there is nothing greater than his honoring his parents’ (Mencius 5A4).

Socrates would flatly oppose these Confucian ideas of placing kinship love above anything else, especially above justice and obedience to the laws, because he not only holds that ‘he who acts lawfully is just, and he who acts unlawfully is unjust’ (Xenophon, 1959, p. 315), but also regards justice and the laws as the most precious things to humans (see Woozley, 1971, pp. 308-318). According to the Crito, while disagreeing with the accusations against him, Socrates refuses to leave the prison against the will of the Athenians, because, following the reason appearing to him to be the best, he is convinced that this act would wrong those whom he ought least to wrong and would destroy the laws and the whole state, which brought him into the world, and nurtured and educated him, and that he himself would also be ashamed to violate the most sacred laws. In his view, then, one’s country is higher and holier than one’s parents and it is more unjust to do violence to one’s country by disobeying the law than to one’s parents (see Plato, Crito 50A-54B, Jowett, 1937, pp. 434-438). In the Lysis, Socrates also argues that the persons of wisdom and understanding are far more important and worthy of trust than those ignorant and uneducated relatives in human affairs, and that one’s parents will not love one so far as one is useless due to one’s ignorance (seePlato, Lysis 207D-210D, Jowett, 1937, pp. 35-38). In fact, Socrates is accused of causing his companions to dishonor their fathers and other relations by saying that invalids and litigants get benefit not from their relations but from their doctor or their counsel and that the law allows a son to put his father in prison if he convinces a jury that he is insane.  Xenophon also admits that Socrates does use this language about fathers and relations (see 1959, p. 37).[12] Of course, Confucius would flatly oppose these Socratic ideas of placing justice and wisdom above kinship love, because he would think that they could not make him feel at ease in his innermost heart full of consanguineous affection.

Therefore, although both the thinkers stress the importance of filial love on the similar basis that parents give birth to children, Socrates justifies it on the universal principle of justice and puts rational knowledge above kinship love, whereas Confucius justifies it on the personal experience of blood ties and puts kinship love above anything else. As Rui Zhu points out in a detailed comparison, ‘justice, instead of love or filial piety, is the governing principle in the early Greek ethics’, whereas ‘The mutual love of father and son…becomes the governing principle in the case of Confucianism’ (2002, p. 2). In the final analysis, then, if we can say that ‘moral reason’ dominates Socrates’ ethics, perhaps we have to say that ‘consanguineous affection’ dominates Confucius’ ethics, since he regards this specific moral feeling not only as the ultimate foundation of human life but also as its supreme principle.

4. Concluding Remarks

Undeniably, there are quite a few similarities between Confucius’ and Socrates’ ethics: both of the two thinkers devote their attention to human affairs, especially to moral virtues; both of them try to connect their ethical inquiries with their beliefs in heaven or the gods; more significantly, both of them eventually find or establish an ultimate ‘principle’ or ‘reason’ (li) for human life, especially for moral actions, through their approaches—that is the chief reason why they have been regarded as the founders of Chinese and Western ethics respectively. Undeniably again, what Socrates finds or establishes is indeed the so-called ‘moral reason’, because he holds that the ultimate principle of moral life lies in nothing other than rational knowledge in human mind. However, this does not mean that what Confucius finds or establishes is a sort of ‘moral reason’, too. As argued above, he never ascribes all virtues to rational knowledge, but always highlights the great importance of moral sentiment in the ethical sphere and especially cherishes kinship love as the sacred foundation for human life. For Confucius, therefore, the ultimate principle of moral life lies in nothing other than consanguineous affection in human heart. Put in the terms of Pascal, we may say that, though both of them find an ultimate ‘reason’ for human life, what Socrates finds is the ‘reason’ of human mind, whereas what Confucius finds is one of the ‘reasons’ of human heart (see Pascal, 1973, p. 59). In other words, what Socrates finds is the ‘rationales’ of moral life, whereas what Confucius finds is the ‘emotionales’ of moral life. Consequently, there are inevitably some profound differences between their ethics, so that we have no sound reason, be it in our intellectual mind or in our affective heart, to impose the rationalist framework of Socrates’ ethics upon Confucius’ ethics and to confuse the former with the latter by asserting that both belong to ‘moral reason’.Therefore, the following remark also applies to the comparison between Confucius and Socrates in this sense:

The broad traditions of Plato and Aristotle are unlikely to have any true counterparts in classical China. This means that not only should we avoid the temptation to look for Chinese versions of Plato and Aristotle, but we should be sensitive to the difficulties of employing the major theoretical categories drawn from either of these versions in interpreting Chinese thinkers. (Hall & Ames, 1995, p. 81)

Confusions of this kind could not lift Confucius’ ethics or Chinese philosophy to a higher level; rather, it will blots out their own characteristic spirits as well as their own distinctive contributions to the philosophical thought of humankind.

To be sure, Confucius’ ethics is one-sided because it neglects the significant and constructive function of rational knowledge in human life substantially and regards kinship love alone as the ultimate root and supreme principle of human life. For these reasons, it has not only fallen into some profound paradoxes in theory, but also brought about a series of negative effects in practice. One of these effects is that quite a few Chinese have often tended to put the so-called ‘renqing’ or ‘guanxi’ (the particular affective relations between such specific persons as relatives, friends, and acquaintances) above universal legal provisions and thus lacked the respect for the rule of law. Through a detailed comparison between Confucius’ statements in Lunyu 13:18 and Socrates’ ones in the Crito, we can discern how the ‘emotionales’ of Confucius’ ethics form an important spiritual-cultural source of this kind of phenomena. Surely, the ‘rationales’ of Socrates’ ethics may remedy the defects of Confucius’ emotional ethics in this regard.

On the other hand, Socrates’ ethics are also one-sided because it neglects the significant and constructive function of moral feelings in human life substantially and regards rational knowledge alone as the ultimate root and supreme principle of human life. For these reasons, it has not only fallen into some profound paradoxes in theory, but also brought about a series of negative effects in practice, too. One of these effects is that quite a few Westerners have often tended to regard the peoples lacking the rationalized civilization of the Western kind as inferior barbarians in a sort of ‘rational supremacist collective-unconsciousness’, which is deeply rooted in the ‘rationales’ of Socrates’ ethics in large measure. As for its defects in theory, Vlastos persuasively analyzes some paradoxes of Socrates as a ‘heartless intellectual’, including the one that ‘if you do have this kind of knowledge, you cannot fail to be good and act as a good man should, in the face of any emotional stress or strain’ (1971, pp. 4-9). In the final analysis, although we have not yet known up to now with the rational certainty whatever justice is in essence, this does not mean that nobody has ever done anything just out of moral emotions in real life. Unfortunately, while starting affirming the positive role of non-rational factors in the moral domain to some extent, many Western rational philosophers are still inclined to depreciate moral feelings and display this one-sidedness of Socrates’ ethics even today. For example, in defending his stance of ethical cognitivism, Habermas claims,

Of course, however indispensable the cognitive function of moral feelings, they do not have a monopoly on the truth…. Certainly moral feelings initially sensitize us to moral phenomena, and in questions of the justification and application of norms, they have in addition an invaluable heuristic function. But they cannot be the final reference point for judging the phenomena they bring to light. (1993, p.175)  

Nonetheless, it seems that we have also sound reason to say that moral cognition or reason does not have a monopoly on the truth and cannot be the final reference point for judging the phenomena it brings to light, either. Surely, the ‘emotionales’ of Confucius’ ethics may remedy the defects of Western rational ethics in this regard.

Needless to say, it will be more significant if we could integrate Confucius’ and Socrates’ ethics with each other as well as with other ethical traditions in the world and finally establish a new, all-embracing ethic at our global times through reconstructive criticism of them. However, one of the indispensable prerequisites for this integration is that we ought to discern the similarities and differences between Confucius’ and Socrates’ ethics carefully and then ascertain their respective spirits and their distinctive advantages and disadvantages in theory and in practice.